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TAXATION-REAL ESTATE TAX EXEMPTION-PURELY PUBLIC
CHARITIES-The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that a
private nursing home that has a significant number of Medi-
care/Medicaid patients qualifies as a purely public charity and is
therefore exempt from payment of local real estate taxes.
St. Margaret Seneca Place v. Board of Property Assessment,
Appeals & Review, 640 A.2d 380 (Pa. 1994).
St. Margaret Seneca Place ("Seneca Place") is a nursing home
located in Penn Hills, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.' Seneca
Place is a subsidiary of the St. Margaret Health System, Inc.2
St. Margaret Health System operates St. Margaret Memorial
Hospital, an acute care hospital, and St. Margaret Foundation, a
fundraising organization.3 St. Margaret Health System, St. Mar-
garet Memorial Hospital, and St. Margaret Foundation are all
tax exempt organizations.'
The patients who reside at Seneca Place are transferred from
St. Margaret's Hospital when the patients no longer require
acute care.5 All of Seneca Place's patients are self-paying or
1. St. Margaret Seneca Place v. Board of Property Assessment, Appeals &
Review, 604 A.2d 1119, 1121 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992), reu'd, 640 A.2d 380 (Pa. 1994).
Seneca Place is a 156-bed facility. Seneca Place, 604 A.2d at 1121.
2. St. Margaret Seneca Place v. Board of Property Assessment, Appeals &
Review, 640 A.2d 380, 382 (Pa. 1994).
S. Seneca Place, 640 A.2d at 382. An acute care hospital is defined as "either
a short term care hospital in which the average length of patient stay is less than
thirty days, or a short term care hospital in which over 50% of all patients are
admitted to units where the average length of patient stay is less than thirty days."
29 C.F.R. § 103.30(0(2) (1993).
4. Seneca Place, 640 A.2d at 382. Federal tax exempt organizations include
"[clorporations, and any community chest, fund or foundation, organized and operat-
ed exclusively for religious, charitable ... or educational purposes." 26 U.S.C. §
501(c)(3) (1988). Federal tax exempt status under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code does not automatically confer local tax exempt status. Seneca Place
was established in the 1980s with a 1.5 million dollar grant from St. Margaret
Health System, a 6 million dollar bond issue guaranteed by St. Margaret Hospital,
and an $850,000 interest-free loan from St. Margaret Hospital. Seneca Place, 640
A.2d at 382.
5. Seneca Place, 604 A.2d at 1122. Seneca Place provides three levels of care
to its patients: skilled care, intermediate care, and personal care. Id. at 1121.
Skilled care is given to patients who require significant medical attention; intermedi-
ate, or long-term care is given to patients who need assistance in performing daily
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require insurance payments to cover the cost of their care.'
Seneca Place opened in 1989 and applied to the Allegheny
County Board of Property Assessment, Appeals and Review (the
"Board") for an exemption from real estate taxes.7 Seneca Place
contended that because its property was used primarily for char-
itable purposes it should be granted a tax exemption.8 The
Board ruled that Seneca Place was not a purely public charity
and denied the exemption.9
Seneca Place appealed this decision to the Court of Common
Pleas of Allegheny County and the court reversed the Board's
decision.'0 The court concluded that Seneca Place was a purely
public charity. 1 The court noted that Seneca Place was founded
and maintained by public or private charity. 2 Further, the
court found that Seneca Place met the five necessary elements
to be considered a purely public charity under the test developed
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Hospital Utilization
Project v. Commonwealth."5
The Board appealed the decision of the common pleas court to
the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court. 4 The Board argued
that Seneca Place had not met its burden of proving that it was
a purely public charity, founded by public or private charity, and
maintained by public or private charity. 6 The commonwealth
court applied the five-part .IUP test and held that Seneca Place
tasks or who are disoriented; and personal care is a combination of skilled care and
intermediate care. Id.
6. Id. at 1122. Approximately 48.5% of Seneca Place's patients were covered
by Medicaid, 10.7% by Medicare, 10.2% by Blue Cross, and 30.6% paid privately. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. A tax exemption is "[ilmmunity from paying taxes in whole or in part."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1461 (6th ed. 1990).
9. Seneca Place, 604 A.2d at 1122. The Pennsylvania Constitution empowers
the Pennsylvania General Assembly to exempt purely public charities from paying
taxes. PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2.
10. In re St. Margaret Seneca Place, 139 Pittsburgh Leg. J. 249 (1991), rev'd,
604 A.2d 1119 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992), rev'd, 640 A.2d 380 (Pa. 1994).
11. Seneca Place, 139 Pittsburgh Leg. J. at 249.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 250 (citing Hospital Utilization Project v. Commonwealth, 487 A.2d
1306 (Pa. 1985)). The test employed by the court is referred to as the "HUP test.'
The HUP test mandates classification of an organization as a purely public charity if
the organization: "(a) Advances a charitable purpose; (b) Donates or renders gratu-
itously a substantial portion of its services; (c) Benefits a substantial and indefinite
class of persons who are legitimate subjects of charity; (d) Relieves the government
of some of its burden; and (e) Operates entirely free from private profit motive."
Hospital Utilization Project, 487 A.2d at 1317. See notes 85-94 and accompanying
text for further discussion of Hospital Utilization Project.
14. Seneca Place, 604 A.2d at 1119. The Municipality of Penn Hills and the
Penn Hills School District joined in the Board's appeal. Id. at 1121.
15. Id. at 1123.
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met none of the criteria, and therefore, concluded that the nurs-
ing home was not a purely public charity.'"
The court reasoned that Seneca Place did not advance a chari-
table purpose because it intended to make a profit by charging a
fee to its patients for care. 7 Because Seneca Place did not at-
tempt to serve those patients who could not afford its fee, the
court determined that Seneca Place did not donate or gratuitous-
ly render a substantial portion of its services." Furthermore,
the court opined that Seneca Place did not benefit a substantial
and indefinite class of persons who were legitimate subjects of
charity because the nursing home did not admit patients who
could not afford its services. 9 In addition, the court found that
Seneca Place did not relieve a governmental burden because
Medicare and Medicaid payments were a substantial portion of
the home's revenue."0 The court decided that Seneca Place in-
tended to make a profit in 1991 and, therefore, did not operate
entirely free from private profit motive. 2' The court concluded
that Seneca Place was not founded or maintained by public or
private charity, and reversed the decision of the common pleas
court.
22
Seneca Place petitioned for allowance of appeal to the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania, which granted allocatur.' The
sole issue considered by the supreme court was whether Seneca
Place qualified as a purely public charity.'
16. Id. at 1123-26.
17. Id. at 1124.
18. Id. at 1125. The court likened Seneca Place to a commercial airline in
that Seneca Place intended to fill all of its beds with patients, whether paying or
non-paying, much in the same way that commercial airlines seek to fill their planes,
even with passengers who pay less than full price. Id. The court reasoned that it
was a matter of business practice, and not charity, that prompted Seneca Place and
airlines to lose money. Id.
19. Seneca Place, 604 A.2d at 1125.
20. Id. Medicare and Medicaid payments comprised 59.2% of Seneca Place's
revenues. Id.
21. Id. at 1126. Although Seneca Place operated at a loss in 1989 and 1990,
its operating budget predicted a profit in 1991. Id.
22. Id. at 1126-27. The court reasoned that the loans and bonds that estab-
lished Seneca Place had to be repaid and therefore were not charity. Id. at 1126. In
addition, the court held that Seneca Place was maintained by the fees it charged for
its services, and not by charity. Id.
23. Seneca Place, 640 A.2d at 382. Allocatur is a term used to denote that a
writ or order is allowed. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 75 (6th ed. 1990).
24. Seneca Place, 640 A.2d at 382. The court determined that if Seneca Place
was a purely public charity the home would be exempted from paying real estate
taxes. Id. The court stressed the importance of reviewing this issue because the
commonwealth court's decision denying Seneca Place's request for tax exempt status
was a-"serious departure" from prior supreme court rulings. Id. Also, the court de-
termined that the holding of the instant case would have broad ramifications on
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The supreme court applied the HUP test to determine if Sene-
ca Place qualified as a purely public charity.' In assessing the
first prong of the test, the court reasoned that Seneca Place
advanced a charitable purpose because any profits realized by
Seneca Place would be used to service the nursing home's
debt.2" Also, the court determined that Seneca Place's accep-
tance of a large portion of patients that relied on Medicaid to
pay for their care was consistent with the requirement that a
public charity advance a charitable purpose.
27
The court further determined that Seneca Place met the sec-
ond requirement of the test because it donated or rendered gra-
tuitously a substantial portion of its services." The court deter-
mined that because Seneca Place accepted Medicaid patients
and subsidized the difference between Medicaid payments and
the cost of providing services to the patients that received assis-
tance, a substantial portion of services were rendered gratu-
itously. 9
Applying the third part of the HUP test, the court concluded
that the patients qualified as legitimate subjects of charity3
The court noted that Seneca Place did not discriminate against
Medicaid patients and that these patients' charges were only
partially covered by the government."1 The court further deter-
mined that Seneca Place relieved the government of some of its
burden and therefore satisfied the fourth prong of the test.32
This determination was based on the fact that the home covered
the difference between government payments for Medicaid recip-
ient residents and the cost of providing services to these resi-
dents.3
similar charitable health care facilities. Id.
25. Id. See note 13 for the elements of the HUP test. Justice Flaherty
authored the opinion of the court, which was decided by a five to one vote. Justice
Cappy dissented on the basis of the commonwealth court opinion and Justice
Zappala did not participate in the decision. Id. at 386.
26. Id. at 383. The court applied the first prong of the HUP test which states
that an organization is a purely public charity if it "advances a charitable purpose."
id. at 382.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 383-84.
29. Seneca Place, 640 A.2d at 383-84. Government payments accounted for
approximately two-thirds of the total cost of Seneca Place's Medicaid recipients. Id.
at 382. Seneca Place covered the remaining one-third. Id. The court also noted that
an institution did not have to provide wholly gratuitous services to any of its pa-
tients in order to qualify as a purely public charity. Id. at 384.
30. Id.
31. Id.




Finally, the court opined that Seneca Place fulfilled the last
requirement of the test because the nursing home operated with-
out a profit motive. 4 Although the commonwealth court had
found that Seneca Place projected a surplus for 1991, the su-
preme court reasoned that the surplus did not evidence a profit
motive, because any surplus revenue would have been used to
service Seneca Place's debt. 5 Because Seneca Place satisfied
the five criteria necessary to qualify as a purely public charity,
the supreme court reversed the order of the commonwealth court
and reinstated the order of the trial court granting Seneca Place
real estate tax exempt status.6
The recognition of charitable uses can be traced back to Eng-
lish law as the Charitable Uses Act.37 The Charitable Uses Act
acknowledged institutions that cared for elderly indigents, in-
jured soldiers and sailors, and institutions of learning as valid
charitable uses.3" The Charitable Uses Act was never adopted
by the Pennsylvania Legislature but Pennsylvania courts adopt-
ed its maxims as common law.39
The first express constitutional limitation on taxing power in
Pennsylvania was written into the 1874 Constitution.' The
Pennsylvania General Assembly passed the Act of May 14th,
1874, pursuant to the authority granted by Article IX, section 1
of the Pennsylvania Constitution.41 The Act of 1874 exempted
specific organizations and institutions from paying local taxes if
34. Seneca Place, 640 A.2d at 385 (citing West Allegheny Hospital v. Board of
Property Assessment, Appeals & Review, 455 A.2d 1170 (Pa. 1982) (holding that
surplus revenue used for facility maintenance and operation was not private profit)).
35. Seneca Place, 640 A.2d at 385.
36. Id. at 386. The supreme court opined that it was not necessary for an
institution to be maintained by a charity in order to qualify as a purely public char-
ity. Id. at 385.
37. The Statute of Elizabeth (Charitable Uses Act), 1601, 43 Eliz., ch. 4 (Eng.).
38. 43 Eliz., ch. 4. The statute specifically recognized "[r]elief of aged impotent
and poore people . . . maintenance of sicke and maymed Souldiers and Marriners,
Schooles of Learninge, Free Schooles and Schollers in Universities" as charitable
uses. Id.
39. See In re Hill School, 87 A.2d 259, 261 (Pa. 1952) (holding that the Hill
School was exempt from paying real estate taxes as a purely public charity). See
notes 68-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of Hill School.
40. Cyril A. Fox, Jr., The Uneasy Law of Real Estate Tax Exemption in Penn-
sylvania, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 175, 178 (1977). Article IX provided that "the General
Assembly may, by general laws, exempt from taxation . . . institutions of purely
public charity." PA. CONST. of 1874 art. IX, § 1. The Pennsylvania General Assembly
may only grant tax exempt status to those organizations that are purely public
charities. See PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2. The Pennsylvania Constitution was amended
in 1968, and Article IX, section 1 of the 1874 Constitution was rewritten into Article
VIII, section 2. See PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2.
41. Act of May 14th, 1874, 1874 Pa. Laws 158.
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they were "found, endowed, and maintained by public or private
charity."
42
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted a definition of each
element of "purely public charity" in Donohugh's Appeal.' In
Donohugh, the court considered whether the appellee's library.
was a purely public charity and should be exempt from paying
taxes to the City of Philadelphia." In determining that the li-
brary was a public charity, the court held that a public charity
did not have to accept all who applied and could practice
exclusionary membership policies. 5 The court determined that
the word "purely" in purely public charity should be literally
interpreted, and purely public charities had to completely fulfill
a "public purpose."' Because the library fulfilled a public pur-
pose, the court concluded that the appellee's library was a pure-
ly public charity and enjoined the City of Philadelphia from
collecting taxes on the library. 7
The first landmark Pennsylvania Supreme Court case to de-
cide the issue of whether an organization was entitled to tax
exempt status as a purely public charity was Trustees of Acade-
my of Protestant Episcopal Church v. Taylor." In Episcopal
Academy, a school sought exemption from paying real estate
taxes to the City of Philadelphia."9 After defining public chari-
ty, o the supreme court held that in order to qualify as a purely
public charity, an organization had to be self-sufficient and could
not make a profit."' The court held that once this requirement
was met, the organization must then be tested according to the
statutory provisions of the Act of 1874. In this case, the court
42. Id. The Act of 1874 specifically exempted "churches, meeting-houses,
or ...places of stated worship ...burial-grounds not used or held for private or
corporate profit[,] ...hospitals, universities, colleges, seminaries, academies, associa-
tions, and institutions of learning." Id.
43. 86 Pa. 306 (Pa. 1878). The supreme court fully adopted the trial court's
definition of "purely public charity." Donohugh's Appeal, 86 Pa. at 317-18.
44. Donohugh's Appeal, 86 Pa. at 317-18.
45. Id. at 313. The trial court opined that an all-male college or a hospital
that accepted patients with only "recent injuries" could still be public charities. Id.
46. Id. The court opined that an organization need not be operated by the
state but may be a private organization and still qualify as a purely public charity.
Id. at 318.
47. Id. at 318.
48. 25 A. 55 (Pa. 1892) [hereinafter Episcopal Academy].
49. Episcopal Academy, 25 A. at 57.
50. Id. at 56. The court defined a public charity as "whatever is gratuitously
done or given in relief of the public burdens or the advancement of the public good."
Id. The court opined that the classification of schools as institutions of charity pre-
dated the Statute of Charitable Uses. Id.
51. Id. at 57. The court reasoned that an organization must not seek a busi-
ness profit and "must not go beyond self-support." Id.
52. Id. at 56. Precisely, the court held that the appellee must be "founded, en-
Vol. 33:741
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concluded that because the school was maintained by income
from its property and the tuition it charged its pupils, it was
exempt from paying real estate taxes.53
In 1933, the Pennsylvania General Assembly passed the Gen-
eral County Assessment Law, which enabled counties to tax real
estate.54 Pursuant to its authority under the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution, the legislature specifically exempted certain organiza-
tions and associations, much as it had done in the Act of
1874.55
The holding of Episcopal Academy was expanded nearly a
half-century later in YMCA of Germantown v. City of Philadel-
phia.' In YMCA of Germantown, the appellant sought real es-
tate tax exempt status for a dormitory that was part of its larger
YMCA facility.57 The issue before the supreme court was
whether the dormitory section of the appellant's facility was,
from a charitable standpoint, an integral part of the larger, tax
exempt facility."M The court noted that in addition to the re-
quirement that an organization be self-sufficient, the organiza-
tion had to also relieve the government of part of its burden in
order to qualify as a purely public charity." The court also as-
serted that an organization had to provide its services at a nomi-
nal or negligible charge to legitimate subjects of charity in order
to qualify as a purely public charity.' The court compared the
appellant's dormitory to commercial lodging facilities and rea-
soned that neither were purely public charities."' Because the
appellant's dormitory did not meet the court's criteria, the court
dowed and maintained by public or private charity." Id.
53. Id. at 57, The bulk of the appellee's maintenance was obtained from the
tuition payments of students that paid full tuition. Id. at 56.
54. General County Assessment Law, Act of May 22, 1933, P.L. 833 (codified
as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 5020-1 to 5020-602 (1968 & Supp. 1994)).
The statute exempts "[a]ll hospitals, universities, colleges, seminaries, [and] acade-
mies . . . founded, endowed, and maintained by public or private charity" from pay-
ing all property taxes. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5020-204(a).
55. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5020-204.
56. 187 A. 204 (Pa. 1936), overruled in part by West Allegheny Hospital v.
Board of Property Assessment, Appeals & Review, 455 A.2d 1170, 1173 (Pa. 1982).
57. YMCA of Germantown, 187 A. at 205.
58. Id. at 207-08. Although the court was not called on to consider whether
the YMCA facilities, excluding the dormitory, served a purely public charitable pur-
pose, the court opined that the facilities were a place of "charity or benevolence." Id.
at 214.
59. Id. at 208, 210.
60. Id. at 209. This requirement was overruled by the Supreme Court in West
Allegheny Hospital where the court stated that, "[s]uch a requirement clearly con-
flicts with the evident intent . . . to accommodate evolving institutional needs." West
Allegheny Hospital, 455 A.2d at 1173.
61. YMCA of Germantown, 187 A. at 209.
1995
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concluded that it was not a purely public charity and, therefore,
was not exempted from paying property taxes. 2
The supreme court's requirement in YMCA of Germantown
that an organization had to relieve the government of its burden
was held to be controlling in In re Ogontz School.' In Ogontz
School, the appellant, a private school with an enrollment of
300, applied for an exemption from real estate taxes. 6 The
court ruled that because the majority of the students that at-
tended the school paid full tuition, the students were not objects
of charity and therefore the institution did not relieve the gov-
ernment of any of its burden.' Additionally, the court opined
that because only a small number of students received scholar-
ships and the scholarships were funded from the tuition pay-
ments of the students that paid full tuition, the students on
scholarship were also not recipients of charity." Therefore, the
court held that because the appellant did not qualify as a purely
public charity, the private school was not exempt from paying
taxes. 7
In In re Hill School," the Pennsylvania Supreme Court es-
tablished a new criterion for an organization to qualify as a
purely public charity. In Hill School, the supreme court consid-
ered whether the non-profit educational corporation was exempt
from paying real estate taxes as a purely public charity under
the Pennsylvania Constitution and the General County Assess-
ment Law.69 The court held that in order for an organization to
qualify as a purely public charity, the organization had to oper-
ate entirely free from private profit motive.7" The court deter-
62. Id. at 214. Only about 12 of the 94 dormitory residents were unemployed
and relied on gratuitous lodging. Id. at 207. The appellant charged an average fee of
$5.00 per week to its residents, one-half of whom earned more than $100.00 per
month in wages. Id. at 209-10.
63. 65 A.2d 150, 153 (Pa. 1949). The appellant applied for an exemption from
real estate taxes on the theory that the private school was a tax exempt charitable
organization. Ogontz School, 65 A.2d at 151.
64. Ogontz School, 65 A.2d at 152.
65. Id. at 153-54. Approximately 90% of the students paid full tuition. Id. at
153.
66. Id. The appellant provided two to four full scholarships per year and 50 to
75 partial scholarships per year. Id.
67. Id. at 164.
68. 87 A.2d 259 (Pa. 1952).
69. Hill School, 87 A.2d at 261.
70. Id. at 262. Hill School, a non-profit educational corporation, sought exemp-
tion from paying property taxes. Id. at 262-63. The court noted that the word
"purely" in purely public charity mandated that an organization operate entirely free
from a private profit motive. Id. at 263 (citing Burd Orphan Asylum v. School Dis-
trict of Upper Darby, 90 Pa. 21 (1879)).
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mined that an organization could qualify as a purely public
charity even if it received payment for services rendered.7 The
court also asserted that an organization could not have business
or commercial interests and be classified as a purely public char-
ity." Because this non-profit corporation conformed to these re-
quirements, the court granted it tax exempt status.73
Ten years later, in In re Woods Schools,7 the supreme court
was faced with the issue of whether a school for handicapped
students qualified as a purely public charity.7 In Woods
Schools, the court asserted that an organization seeking to be
classified as a purely public charity had to donate or render
gratuitously a substantial portion of its services.7" The court
reasoned that it was permissible for an organization to charge a
fee for its services but the organization had to nonetheless use
the revenue from such fees to make the organization accessible
to those who could not pay for services.77 Because the appellant
accepted only those who were able to pay for its services, the
court held that this school for handicapped students was not a
purely public charity and was therefore not exempt from paying
property taxes."
Shortly after its decision in Woods Schools, the supreme court
reaffirmed the requirement that a purely public charity had to
operate entirely free from a private profit motive in In re Tax
Appeals of United Presbyterian Homes.79 In United Presbyterian
Homes, the appellee sought real estate tax exempt status for its
home for elderly residents.' The sole issue considered by the
71. Hill School, 87 A.2d at 262. The court noted that a hospital that received
payment for services would qualify as a purely public charity as long as its facilities
were "available to all." Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 264. In determining that the school met the criterion, the court re-
lied on the lower court's findings that the school operated at a surplus in only three
years of its 29-year existence and that fees charged to students accounted for only
82% of the school's operating costs. Id.
74. 178 A.2d 600 (Pa. 1962).
75. Woods Schools, 178 A.2d at 601. The appellant operated a facility for the
education, treatment and care of physically, mentally, socially or emotionally handi-
capped adults and children. Id.
76. Id. at 604.
77. Id. The court distinguished the instant case from Episcopal Academy be-
cause the school in Episcopal Academy used its excess revenue derived from tuition
charges to fund scholarships for students who were unable to pay. Id. In contrast,
the appellant used its excess profits for facility improvements and expansion. Id. at
603.
78. Id. at 603-04.
79. 236 A.2d 776, 780 (Pa. 1968).
80. United Presbyterian Homes, 236 A.2d at 777. The appellee's home accepted
individuals aged 65 and over. Id.
1995
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court was whether the appellee's home was a purely public char-
ity.8 In determining that the home was a public charity, the
court asserted that the appellee's real estate was used for a
charitable purpose and the appellee's home was not in competi-
tion with other similar commercial homes. 2 The court also fo-
cused on the fact that the home had never realized a profit."
These three factors indicated to the court that the home for the
elderly was a purely public charity and should be exempt from
property taxes.8s
The supreme court relied on over one hundred years of com-
mon law that interpreted the meaning of the purely public chari-
ty constitutional exemption provision to formulate a five-part
test in Hospital Utilization Project v. Commonwealth.' In Hos-
pital Utilization Project, the appellant, a collector of statistical
data, sought an exemption from paying sales and use taxes."
The issue before the court was whether 'the appellant qualified
as a purely public charity so that it was constitutionally and
statutorily exempt from paying sales and use taxes. 7 Because a
precise definition of purely public charity had not been formulat-
ed prior to Hospital Utilization Project, the court adopted a five-
part test based on prior case law."
The HUP test mandates classification of an organization as a
purely public charity if it: "(a) Advances a charitable purpose; (b)
Donates or renders gratuitously a substantial portion of its ser-
vices; (c) Benefits a substantial and indefinite class of persons
who are legitimate subjects of charity; (d) Relieves the govern-
ment of some of its burden; and (e) Operates entirely free from
81. Id. at 778.
82. Id. at 779. The court's assertion was in response to the appellant's argu-
ment that the appellee's home was in direct competition with other commercial
homes and therefore could not be granted real estate tax exempt status. Id. at 778.
83. Id. at 780. The court noted that courts historically have ruled that homes
for the elderly that operate at or below cost were charitable organizations. Id. (quot-
ing Fifield Manor v. County of Los Angeles, 10 Cal. Rptr. 242 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1961)). The court emphasized that if the appellee's home had made a profit, the
profit would not have benefitted an individual or a private, for-profit corporation.
United Presbyterian Homes, 236 A.2d at 780.
84. United Presbyterian Homes, 236 A.2d at 780. The court also reasoned that
because of the ever-increasing lifespan of Americans, facilities such as the appellee's
home should be supported by a liberal interpretation of the definition of "purely
public charity." Id. at 779.
85. 487 A.2d 1306 (Pa. 1985).
86. Hospital Utilization Project, 487 A.2d at 1309. The appellant collected and
collated medical statistical data for a consortium of hospitals. Id. Charitable organi-
zations are exempt from paying sales and use taxes under the Tax Reform Code of
1971. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7204(10) (1991).
87. Hospital Utilization Project, 487 A.2d at 1310.
88. Id. at 1312.
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private profit motive." 9
The court applied the five-p"t test to the appellant and re-
vealed that its eleemosynary' characteristics were no greater
than those of similar for-profit entities.9 The court emphasized
the criterion that the appellant operate free from private profit
motive.2 The court found that the appellant had accumulated a
profit and reinvested it to upgrade its computer resources. 3
Therefore, the court concluded, the appellant was not exempt
from paying sales and use taxes as a purely public charity."
The HUP test synthesized the supreme court's divergent ratio-
nales that were applied to determine if organizations qualified
as purely public charities. The court required that an organiza-
tion relieve part of a governmental burden and provide its ser-
vices io legitimate objects of charity as per its holding in YMCA
of Germantown.95 The court also used the holding of Hill School
that mandated that an organization operate entirely free from a
private profit motive." Additionally, the court adopted the lan-
guage of Woods Schools and required organizations to donate or
render gratuitously a substantial portion of their services in
order to be classified as purely public charities. 7
The supreme court's decision in Seneca Place affirmed the
court's adherence to the HUP test as the sole method of deter-
mining whether an institution qualified as a purely public chari-
ty. The test was a logical development because a court, in order
to decide if an organization qualified as a purely public charity,
had to perform a complete analysis of nearly a century of case
law that interpreted the phrase "purely public charity." The
HUP test provided an effective legal definition of purely public
charity, and lower courts may apply the HUP test on a case-by-
case basis. The court correctly applied the HUP test in Seneca
Place because the test is universal in scope and can be applied
89. Id. at 1317.
90. Eleemosynary is defined as "of, relating to, or supported by charity."
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 402 (9th ed. 1983).
91. Hospital Utilization Project, 487 A.2d at 1314.
92. Id. at 1317-18.
93. Id. at 1318. The court noted that the appellant operated at a net profit
for three consecutive years. Id. at 1310. The appellant used the profits to purchase
computer terminals, develop computer software and mitigate future revenue short-
falls. Id.
94. Id. at 1318. The court further held that the appellant was not exempt
from paying sales and use taxes. Id.
95. YMCA of Germantown, 187 A. at 210. See notes 56-62 and accompanying
text.
96. Hill School, 87 A.2d at 262. See notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
97. Woods Schools, 178 A.2d at 604. See notes 74-78 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Woods Schools.
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to a diverse array of organizations. Application of the test can be
performed by trial and appellate courts with equal relevance to
educational institutions, medical care facilities, and nursing
homes.
In Seneca Place, the supreme court did not mask its disap-
proval of the commonwealth court's denial of Seneca Place's tax
exempt status.9 8 However, the supreme court did not cite to
precedent to which the commonwealth court's ruling in Seneca
Place was anomalous. In fact, the supreme court, in United
Presbyterian Homes, discounted the precedential value of cases
that determined whether an organization qualified as a purely
public charity." Also, the supreme court did not disapprove of
commonwealth court holdings prior to Seneca Place that denied
tax exempt status for retirement homes for the elderly.' ° The
supreme court's decision in Seneca Place was primarily con-
cerned with the implications of the commonwealth court's denial
of tax exempt status to Seneca Place. As the supreme court
emphasized in United Presbyterian Homes, nursing homes serve
an important social function and should be fiscally supported by
liberal interpretations of real estate tax exemption laws.'' De-
nial of tax exempt status to Seneca Place would have sharply
contrasted with this policy.
The holding of Seneca Place, at least superficially, allows real
estate tax exempt status for nursing home facilities. However,
the holding will likely be constrained to the facts of the case
because of the court's reliance on public policy. The court relied
heavily on Seneca Place's acceptance of a large number of Medic-
aid and Medicare patients"°r and the fact that the home did
not operate at a surplus, and if it did, the surplus funds would
be used for debt service.1°3 Therefore, the precedential value of
Seneca Place will most likely be limited to its explicit reiteration
98. Seneca Place, 640 A.2d at 382. See note 24 for the court's precise lan-
guage.
99. United Presbyterian Homes, 236 A.2d at 778. The court reaffirmed this
position in G.D.L. Plaza Corp. v. Council Rock School District. See G.D.L. Plaza
Corp. v. Council Rock School District, 526 A.2d 1173, 1175 (Pa. 1987) (holding that
an apartment complex for elderly residents was not exempt from taxes as a purely
public charity).
100. See, e.g., Lutheran Home at Topton v. Board of Assessment Appeals, 515
A.2d 59 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986), allocatur denied, 527 A.2d 548 (Pa. 1987), allocatur
denied, 529 A.2d 1084 (Pa. 1987) (holding that a retirement facility for the elderly
did not advance a charitable purpose and therefore was not entitled to tax exempt
status).
101. United Presbyterian Homes, 236 A.2d at 779.
102. See Seneca Place, 640 A.2d at 382. See note 29 and accompanying text.
103. Id. See note 35 and accompanying text.
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and application of the HUP test and the supreme court's under-
lying policy reason of favoring tax exempt status for nursing
homes.
In the future, cashed-starved counties and municipalities in
Pennsylvania will increasingly look to traditionally tax exempt
organizations to help alleviate budget shortfalls.'" Although
the HUP test provides a reliable means to determine whether
hospitals, nursing homes, educational institutions and the like
qualify for tax exempt status, it is a fact-dependent test that will
certainly lead to lengthy litigation and numerous appeals. How-
ever, this inherent shortfall is overcome by the obvious finality
that results from a ruling by the supreme court that is based on
application of the facts of the case to the HUP test. Any alterna-
tive non-legislative means of determining if an organization is a
purely public charity would likely suffer similar shortfalls and
provide a much more obscure method of determination and anal-
ysis.
Jonathan C. Parks
104. See, e.g., Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania v. Board of Revision
of Taxes, 649 A.2d 154, 161 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994) (applying the HUP test to de-
termine if certain properties owned by the University of Pennsylvania should be
exempt from real estate taxes); Couriers-Susquehanna, Inc. v. County of Dauphin,
645 A.2d 290, 292-94 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994) (applying the HUP test to determine if
an elder care home qualified as a purely public charity); Appeal of the City of
Washington v. Board of Assessment Appeals of Washington County, 74 Wash. Cty.
Rep. 114, 119-25 (1994) (applying the HUP test to determine if Washington and Jef-
ferson College qualified for real estate tax exempt status as a purely public charity).
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